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Earnest G. Clark and Verda 
Clark, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
John Harr, Sr., 
Plaintiff in Substitution 
and Appellant, 
V. 
Morris Myers and Royal K. Hunt, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
DOCKET NO. 1^0 
Case No. 950526-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from a final order of the Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Presiding 
Randy M. Lish 3823 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
853 W. Center 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Atrorney for Respondents 
Clarks and Harr 
Larry L. Whyte 4942 
265 East 100 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tele: 801 364 0242 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Myers and Hunt 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERNEST G. CLARK and VERDA CLARK, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
JOHN HARR, SR., 
NO.950526-CA 
Plaintiff in Substitution 
and Appellant 
V. 
MORRIS MYERS and ROYAL K. HUNT, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendants and appellees, Myers and Hunt, 
herewith make and file their petition for re-
hearing in reference to the MEMORANDUM 
DECISION (Not For Official Publication) of the 
Court and with particularity state the points 
of law or fact overlooked or misapprehended by 
the Court, as follows: 
Argument 
Facts relevant to this petition: On 
February 26, 1990, plaintiffs-appellants Clark 
obtained a judgment against Hunt and Myers for 
$74,739.00 (r. 272-75). Appellee Hunt filed 
chapter 7 bankruptcy in 1992 and scheduled 
several judgments, including the Clark 
judgment for $74,739.00, in Schedule F as 
unsecured nonpriority claims (r. 315). Hunt 
also scheduled the real property at 8171 South 
Marion View Circle in Sandy, Utah, as a real 
property asset. 
Hunt was discharged in the bankruptcy on 
October 19, 1992 (r. 314) and his personal 
liability on the Clark judgment was thereby 
discharged; see 11 USC 524(a) 
On October 11, 1994, a general execution 
was issued at Harr's instance to which was 
attached Harr's attorney's praecipe to the 
sheriff "to levy upon the real property of 
Royal K. Hunt 8177 South Marion View Circle, * 
* *"; the sheriff then filed his notice of 
levy (r. 374-75). Hunt's motion for an order 
vacating the execution and levy was granted on 
February 27, 1995 (r. 513-14). 
Harr's appeal resulted in the Court's 
Memorandum Decision (Not For Publication) 
reversing the lower court's order vacating the 
execution and levy. 
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In its decision the Court mentions 
Dewsnup v. Timm 502 U.S. 410 (1992) to support 
its conclusion; Dewsnup involves a Deed of 
Trust, not a judgment, which precludes the 
application of 11 USC Sec. 524(a) which 
specifies that a discharge in a bankruptcy 
case voids any judgment to the extent that it 
is a determination of the personal liability 
of the debtor with respect to the prepetition 
debt, and operates as an injunction against 
the commencement of an action, the employment 
of process, or an act, to collect, recover or 
offset any such debt as a personal liability 
of the debtor, * * * The injunction is to 
give complete effect to the discharge. The 
Court also mentions Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 
P.2d 938 (Utah 1988) which does involve a 
judgment. In that case, as in this case, the 
bankruptcy discharged the debtor's personal 
liability on the judgment and the Utah Court 
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was not disposed to continue the "lien 
independent of the judgment on which it is 
based." Cox Corp.
 # 754 P.2d, at 939. This is 
the position appellees' took in their 
answering brief in the appeal. See In re 
Duncan, 60 B.R. 345 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Ala. 1986) 
which is in accord with Utah's Cox Corporation 
case. 
"Applying the basic law of judgments, 
the discharge in this case released the 
debtor [ ] from the debt * * * represented 
by the judgment. 11 USC Sec. 727(b). 
Section 727(b) is the heart of the fresh 
start provisions of bankruptcy law. The 
effect of release from the judgment debt 
is to extinguish the judgment. The 
judgment itself is void. 11 USC Sec. 
524(a). Since a judgment lien cannot 
exist independently of the judgment, 
such lien is discharged by the 
satisfaction and extinguishment of the 
judgment. 47 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 
995.,f In re Duncan, 60 B.R. 345, 348. 
Conclusion 
In its decision the Court states 
"Plaintiff's [sic] are entitled to satisfy any 
deficiencies remaining on their judgment 
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through their security interest in Defendants' 
property owned on the date of Plaintiff's 
original judgment against Defendants." This 
is an open invitation to violate the 
injunctive provisions of Sec. 524(a) and of 
course any such efforts in that regard could 
rightfully be met with contempt citations from 
the federal district court. And it is 
apparent that any such efforts will be futile. 
In addition, the Court's decision amounts to a 
deprivation of rights and benefits secured by 
Sec. 524(a) in violation of 28 USC Sec. 
1343(3), and 42 USC Sec. 1983 and is therefore 
unconstitutional and void. 
WHEREFORE, appellants move the Court to 
grant rehearing and to vacate the memorandum 
decision of March 7, 1996, and thereafter to 
affirm the orders of the lower court. The 
undersigned certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
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On March 20, 1996, two copies of the 
foregoing mailed to Randy M. Lish, McCullough, 
Jones & Ivins, 853 West Center, Or em, Utah 
84058. 
LARRYXt. WHYTEKJ 
6 
